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Abstract
This online appendix accompanies our paper “Property Rights Over Marital Transfers”.
APPENDIX
A Non-Linear Version
The main model utilizes the simplifications that follow from assuming that an offspring’s con-
sumption is linear in their property and in the property of their spouse. This section outlines
the more general argument where this relationship need not be linear.
Let zk denote the property of a gender k offspring, where z f ≡w f and zm ≡wm + t . This
offspring consumes ck (z f , zm ), where ck is strictly increasing in both arguments but need not
be linear. Importantly, property rights matter in the sense that consumption is more sensitive













All other aspects of the model are retained. To help analyze this more general case, we use
the insight of Peters and Siow (2002) and draw connections to the literature on hedonic equi-
librium (Rosen (1974)). To this end, it is useful to let p denote a marriage payment amount
and to pose the problem facing families as one of choosing characteristics and a marriage
payment subject to the marriage payment coinciding with that required by the market for
the chosen characteristics. Thus, for female families the problem is:
max






·w f −p , c f (w f , wm +p )

, s.t. p = t (w f , wm ), (2)
and for male families is:
max






·wm , cm (w f , wm +p )

, s.t. p = t (w f , wm ). (3)
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Starting with the female problem, and letting ` f be the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the marriage payment constraint, the first-order conditions associated with the optimal choices





















= ` f . (6)











− d c fd zm
. (7)
The left side is the slope of the marriage market transfer function and the right side is the slope
of the female indifference curve in (w f , p ) space (i.e. holding wm constant). This optimality
condition is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1 where the curve I f is a typical female
indifference curve. Points ‘under’ the indifference curve are preferred, so optimality requires
that females choose the w f that puts them on the lowest indifference curve subject to lying
on the marriage market price schedule. This is analogous to the Rosen (1974) model whereby
females are the ‘suppliers’ of w f (accounting for the fact that the ‘price’ received is minus p ).








− d c fd zm
. (8)
The left side is again the slope of the marriage market transfer function, and the right side
is the slope of the female indifference curve in (wm , p ) space. This optimality condition is
illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 where the curve I f is a typical female indifference
curve. Points to the right of the indifference curve are preferred, so optimality requires that
females choose the wm that puts them on the right-most indifference curve subject to lying
on the marriage market price schedule. This is analogous to the Rosen (1974) model whereby
females are the ‘consumers’ of wm .
Turning to the male problem, and letting `m be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
marriage payment constraint, the first-order conditions associated with the optimal choices





















= `m . (11)






















Figure 1: Hedonic Pricing Interpretation
The left side is again the slope of the marriage market pricing function and the right side is the
slope of the male indifference curve in (w f , p ) space. This optimality condition is illustrated
in the left panel of Figure 1 where the curve I m is a typical male indifference curve. Points
above the indifference curve are preferred, so optimality requires that males choose the wm
that puts them on the highest indifference curve subject to lying on the marriage market price
schedule. This is analogous to the Rosen (1974) model whereby males are the ‘suppliers’ of
wm .














The left side is again the slope of the marriage market transfer function, and the right side is
the slope of the male indifference curve in (wm , p ) space. This optimality condition is illus-
trated in the right panel of Figure 1 where the curve I m is a typical male indifference curve.
Points above the indifference curve are preferred, so optimality requires that males choose
the wm that puts them on the highest indifference curve subject to lying on the marriage
market price schedule. This is analogous to the Rosen (1974) model whereby males are the
‘suppliers’ of wm .
To solve for equilibrium prices, one computes male and female demand for each charac-
teristic pair and adjusts the marriage market transfer function until male and female demand
coincide at each characteristic pair. Explicitly doing this requires a specific form for the ck
functions. But even if a form were chosen, it is well-known from the hedonic pricing litera-
ture (e.g Heckman et al. (2010) and Ekeland et al. (2004)) that analytical solutions for hedonic
price functions generally do not exist. Indeed, establishing the existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium beyond the linear consumption case we consider is an interesting area of future
research but at present is hindered by the absence of results in the literature beyond special
settings that are fundamentally inappropriate for our purposes (specifically, for quasi-linear
payoff functions; see Chiappori et al. (2010) and Ekeland (2010)).
Nevertheless, we can use the first-order conditions to gain some insight into the struc-
ture of marriage market prices in equilibrium. As we shall see, these insights are qualitatively
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identical to those produced in the linear case of our main model. First, analysis of the male
















































Conditions (14) and (15) are simple generalizations of the prices that we identify in the main
model. In the linear case the terms in braces are constants, so that these prices are the same
across the entire market. In the general setting these prices will generally not be constant
across agents since their equilibrium choices will differ.
Nevertheless, this analysis gives a glimpse into the more general features of the consump-
tion functions, ck , that affect local marriage prices perceived by families at their equilibrium










ically, a decrease in d cmd z f /
d cm
d zm
(e.g. as was caused by an increase inβ in the linear model) raises






raises the price of wm .
B A Symmetric Version
In order to simplify the presentation, our main model contained an inherent asymmetry: we
allow transfers between female families and grooms, but ignore the possibility of transfers
between male families and brides. This section outlines the symmetric counterpart to the
model and demonstrates that doing so has no effect on the main results. In fact, some results
are strengthened if a more symmetric model were used.
Suppose that female families can make a transfer to grooms, denoted tm , and that male
families can make a transfer to brides, denoted t f . The property of females is z f ≡w f +t f , and
of males is zm ≡wm + tm . Both transfers are non-negative: tm , t f ≥ 0. As in the main model,
offspring consumption is given by c k (z f , zm ) = ak · z f + bk · zm and parent consumption is
C k =W − 1θk ·wk − t−k for k ∈ {m , f }.
For given characteristics, w= (wm , w f ), the marriage market specifies a multi-valued func-
tion, t :R2+→R
2, which indicates a pair of prices t(w) = {tm (w), t f (w)} for each characteristic
pair. Given that transfers must be non-negative in this setting, letW ≡





denote the implied equilibrium set of feasible characteristics.
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The equilibrium concept remains as in the main model: briefly, an equilibrium is a mar-
riage market pricing function, t, such that (i) agents take t as given and choose their most
preferred w onW , and (ii) for each A ⊆ R2+, the measure of males choosing w ∈ A equals the
measure of females choosing w ∈ A (i.e. market clearing).
We start with the claim that the only interesting equilibria are those in which the market
requires at most one side to make a positive payment within a given match. Specifically, when
θk > 1 there is never an equilibrium in which families choose characteristics which require
a positive groom-price and a positive bride-price. This is because of a type of ‘no arbitrage’
pricing condition. To explain, consider a bride and groom with characteristics (wm , w f ). Sup-
pose the bride’s family transfers tm to the groom and the groom’s family transfers t f to the
bride, where t f , tm ≥ d > 0. Now consider an alternative arrangement whereby both families
lower their cross-family payment by d units and instead give the d units to their offspring.
That is, the bride’s family transfers t̃m = tm −d to the groom and diverts d to the bride. Since
families always have the option of raising their offspring’s quality by making a cash trans-
fer to them, this means that the bride in effect has a quality of w̃ f = w f + d . At the same
time, the groom’s family transfers t̃ f = t f −d to the bride and diverts d to the groom, effec-
tively generating a quality of t̃m = wm + d . Since all individuals have the same allocations
across the two arrangements, the families treat them as equivalent. This equivalence is re-
flected in equilibrium prices: t(w̃ f , w̃m ) = (t̃ f , t̃m ). More generally, suppose characteristics
w = (w f , wm ) require transfers of t(w) = (t f , tm ) ∈ R2+. Then, for any d ∈ [0, min{t f , tm}], the
qualities w′ = (w f +d , wm +d ) require transfers t′ = (t f −d , tm −d ). This is summarized by
the ‘no-arbitrage’ condition.
Definition 1 (No Arbitrage). For each w, we have t(w+d · 1) = t(w)−d · 1 for all d ∈ [0, t(w)],
where 1≡ (1, 1) and t(w)≡min{t f (w), tm (w)}.
Under the no arbitrage condition, it is straightforward to see that no family would ever
choose characteristics that required a positive groom-price and a positive bride-price: by in-
stead choosing characteristics that were d units higher in each dimension, the family can
keep their consumption and that of their offspring unchanged by the no-arbitrage condition.
But they can do even better than that since they can deliver the additional d units via invest-
ment rather than via cash. This therefore allows them to keep their offspring’s consumption
the same while increasing their own consumption by (1−(1/θk )) ·d > 0, thereby making them
strictly better off.1 Given this, equilibria in which a groomprice and a brideprice are not si-
multaneously paid within the same marriage are the only interesting ones in the sense that
by allowing the market to require t(w′) ∈ R2++ for some characteristics, w
′, we are only giv-
ing ourselves freedom in constraining equilibrium outcomes by specifying off-equilibrium
prices.2
1This result can be demonstrated formally by supposing that a family did choose characteristics such that t f > 0




















not hold since the former is strictly less than unity whereas the latter is strictly larger.)
2As an extreme case, consider an equilibrium with t(w) = (0, 0) if w =w∗ and t(w) = (W̄ , W̄ ) otherwise (where W̄ is


























Figure 2: Symmetric Model
Given the above discussion, we search for three type of equilibia: (i) a groom-price equi-
librium whereby t f (w) = 0 for all w, (ii) a bride-price equilibrium whereby tm (w) = 0 for all w,
and (iii) a hybrid equilibrium whereby t f (w) = 0 for some characteristics whereas tm (w) = 0
for others.
In general terms, the problem facing families of gender k ∈ { f , m} is:
max










In calculating a groom-price equilibrium, we derive optimal characteristic choices using t f (w) =
0. This is essentially the exercise undertaken in the main model, the only difference being
that only characteristics that lead to a groom-prices of at least zero (as opposed to−wm in the
main model) are permitted. That is, in such an equilibrium the marriage market sets a groom-





















The feasible characteristics set, denotedWm for the groom-price case, consists of all charac-
teristics that command a non-negative groom-price. That is:
Wm =







This set is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2. As in the main model, each family has fami-
lies have an optimal total expenditure but are indifferent as to how this is allocated (i.e. males
have a most-preferred wm but are indifferent to w f , and females are indifferent to (wm , w f )
pairs that keep 1θ f ·w f + tm (w f , wm ) constant). The existence of this sort of equilibrium again
requires that we can find a matching of male and female families such that each pair has a
‘compatible’ optimal expenditure (in the sense that there exists a characteristic that induces
the optimal expenditure for both sides), and this arises most easily when matching is positive
assortative on wealth.
In calculating a bride-price equilibrium, we derive optimal characteristic choices using
tm (w) = 0. Taking the analogous steps as in the previous case, one can show that manipula-
tion of the first-order conditions yields an equilibrium marriage market bride-price function:
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The set of feasible characteristics, denotedW f for the bride-price case, consists of all char-
acteristics that command a non-negative bride-price. That is:
W f =







This set is illustrated in the centre panel of Figure 2.
The sets Wm and W f are always disjoint when θk > 1 (they share a common boundary
when θ f = θm = 1). It can be shown that if a pair makes compatible expenditures in a groom-
price equilibrium then they can not make compatible expenditures in a bride-price equi-
librium (and vice-versa). As such, the existence of a groom-price equilibrium precludes the
existence of a bride-price equilibrium.3
It can also be shown that there does not exist a ‘hybrid’ equilibrium in which regions like
Wm and W f coexist. The argument is as follows. Suppose that some pair chose a point in
Wm , such as point a in the right panel of Figure 2. Since families only care about their total
expenditure in equilibrium, the male family is indifferent to the points on the vertical dotted
line (each of which corresponds to an equal expenditure of E ∗m as indicated). Specifically, the
male is indifferent between their equilibrium choice, point a , and choosing a higher quality
female at the expense of a lower groomprice. Specifically, they are indifferent to point b where
no groomprice (or brideprice) is paid. But then they must strictly prefer a higher point, such
as c , since this point also involves no brideprice (or groomprice), but it does involve a strictly
larger w f with no change in wm . This contradicts the original choice being optimal.
Of course, the existence of a groom-price or a bride-price equilibrium is not guaranteed
(as in the main model). What this analysis does reveal however is the process through which
marriage payments disappear. As in the main model, a groom-price equilibrium fails to exist
when θ f becomes too great. Unlike the main model though, we should not expect bride-
prices to arise once groom-prices are pushed to zero. The inefficiency underlying the decline
in bride-prices is also present on the groom’s side–i.e. male families too would find that paying
brides prohibitively inefficient (indeed more so to the extent that θm >θ f ).
In summary, the qualitative conclusions from the main model are not driven by the in-
herent asymmetries. Specifically, the natural symmetric version permits a groom-price equi-
librium with features that are essentially identical to the main model. It also permits a bride-
price equilibrium in which the roles of males and females are switched. The symmetric ver-
sion requires far greater set-up, but does deliver a clearer insight into the process through
which marriage payments disappear.
3The argument is that if there exists a groom-price equilibrium, then there exists one with positive assortative
matching on wealth. But then there does not exist a bride-price equilibrium with positive assortative matching on
wealth, and therefore no bride-price equilibrium exists.
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